PA Protection & Advocacy, Inc. v. Houstoun by unknown
2000 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-3-2000 
PA Protection & Advocacy, Inc. v. Houstoun 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000 
Recommended Citation 
"PA Protection & Advocacy, Inc. v. Houstoun" (2000). 2000 Decisions. 211. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000/211 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2000 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed October 3, 2000 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 99-1969 
 
PENNSYLVANIA PROTECTION & ADVOCACY, INC. 
 
v. 
 
FEATHER HOUSTOUN, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY 
AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
WELFARE OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
 
OF PENNSYLVANIA; 
 
CHARLES CURIE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS 
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF MENTAL 
HEALTH OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE 
 
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; 
 
GREGORY M. SMITH, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY 
AS THE SUPERINTENDENT OF ALLENTOWN 
STATE HOSPITAL, 
       Appellants 
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
(Dist. Court No. 98-cv-04180) 
 
District Court Judge: J. Curtis Joyner 
 
Argued May 23, 2000 
 
Before: ALITO and RENDELL, Circuit Judges, and DUHE, 
Senior Circuit Judge.* 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* The Honorable John M. Duhe, Jr., United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
 
 
  
(Opinion Filed: October 3, 2000) 
 
       James M. Sheehan, General Counsel 
       John A. Kane, Chief Counsel 
       Howard Ulan, Senior Asst. Counsel 
        (argued) 
        Department of Public Welfare 
        Office of Legal Counsel 
        3rd Floor West Health and Welfare 
        Building 
        Harrisburg, PA 17120 
 
        Attorneys for Appellants 
 
       David M. Allen 
        Schuyler, Roche & Zwirner 
        130 East Randolph Street 
        Suite 3800 
        Chicago, IL 60601 
 
        Attorney for Amicus-Appellant 
 
       Mark J. Murphy (argued) 
        Disabilities Law Project 
        1901 Law & Finance Building 
        429 Fourth Avenue 
        Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
 
       Ilene W. Shane 
       Robin Resnick 
        Disabilities Law Project 
        801 Arch Street, Suite 610 
        Philadelphia, PA 19107-2421 
 
        Attorneys for Appellee 
 
       S. Paul Prior 
        New Jersey Protection & Advocacy, 
        Inc. 
        210 South Broad Street, 3rd Floor 
        Trenton, NJ 08608 
 
        Attorney for Amicus-Appellee 
 
                                2 
  
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
In 1986, Congress enacted the Protection and Advocacy 
for Mentally Ill Individuals Act (PAMII), Pub. L. No. 99-319, 
100 Stat. 478 (codified at 42 U.S.C. SS 10801-10905). The 
Act provides funding for the states to establish independent 
organizations (referred to in the Act as "eligible systems") 
that monitor and protect the rights of the mentally ill. See 
42 U.S.C. S 10803. These organizations are intended to 
"investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals 
with mental illness" and to take appropriate action to 
"protect and advocate the rights of such individuals." 
42 U.S.C. S 10801(b). Congress found that funding was 
needed for such organizations because the mentally ill were 
vulnerable to abuse, injury, and neglect and because the 
states' response to these problems was often inadequate. 
See 42 U.S.C. S 10801(a). 
 
Pennsylvania Protection & Advocacy, Inc. (PP & A) is a 
Pennsylvania non-profit corporation that is qualified as an 
"eligible system" under PAMII. Dolores L. attempted suicide 
while a mental patient at Allentown (Pennsylvania) State 
Hospital and, she died five days later. In accordance with 
Allentown State Hospital policy and requirements of the 
Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations, the supervisor of the hospital appointed two 
peer review committees to evaluate the circumstances of 
Dolores L.'s death. These committees produced reports 
(peer review reports) intended to identify any mistakes that 
were made and that could have been avoided and any 
changes that could be made in the hospital's policy or 
practices so as to reduce the likelihood of similar events in 
the future. PP & A requested Dolores L.'s records, but the 
hospital refused to turn over the peer review reports. PP & 
A then filed this action against the responsible 
Pennsylvania officials (the Commonwealth) to challenge the 
refusal to permit access to the peer review reports. The 
District Court held that the reports must be disclosed. We 
affirm. 
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I. 
 
The first issue in this case is whether the peer review 
reports fall within the scope of S 10805 of PAMII, which 
provides that an organization such as PP & A shall,"in 
accordance with section 10806 of this title, have access to 
all records of . . . any individual who is a client of the" 
advocacy organization. 42 U.S.C. S 10805(a)(4)(A)(emphasis 
added). The District Court held that the peer review reports 
fall within this language, and we agree. 
 
The peer review reports certainly constitute "records" in 
the ordinary sense of the term, and they also fall squarely 
within the definition provided in Section 10806 of the Act, 
which states: 
 
       [T]he term "records" includes reports prepared by any 
       staff of a facility rendering care and treatment or 
       reports prepared by an agency charged with 
       investigating reports of incidents of abuse, neglect, and 
       injury occurring at such facility that describe incidents 
       of abuse, neglect, and injury occurring at such facility 
       and the steps taken to investigate such incidents . . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. S 10806(b)(3)(A).1 
 
The plain language of this definition encompasses the 
peer review reports at issue here, since they are clearly 
"reports prepared by . . . staff of a facility rendering care 
and treatment." Id. Allentown State Hospital is "a facility 
rendering care and treatment," and the reports were 
prepared by committees composed of members of the 
hospital's "staff."2 See J.A. 21a-23a. Therefore, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We note that the definition of "records" is preceded in the statute by 
the language: "As used in this section[i.e., S 10806]." 42 U.S.C. 
S 10806(b)(3)(A) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
definition of "records" in S 10806 controls the types of records to which 
PA & A "shall have access" under S 10805 because S 10805 provides that 
an eligible system "shall . . . in accordance with section 10806 of this 
title, have access to" certain records. 42 U.S.C. S 10805(a)(4) (emphasis 
added). In addition, S 10806, which is entitled "Access to records," 
provides that "[a]n eligible system shall have access to the type of 
records described in subparagraph (A) [the definition of "records" in 
S 10806]." 42 U.S.C. S 10806(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added). 
 
2. The peer review reports may also constitute"reports prepared by an 
agency charged with investigating reports of incidents of abuse, neglect, 
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definition of "records" encompasses Dolores L.'s peer review 
reports. 
 
The Commonwealth asserts that S 10806(b)(3)(A) requires 
the disclosure of "incident reports," but not peer review 
reports. Appellant Br. at 7-8 ("Unlike incident reports, 
which are descriptive in nature, peer review reports involve 
high-order inferences evolving from professional analysis 
and evaluation . . . ."). However, the Commonwealth does 
not explain how this distinction fits the language of the 
statute; nor does the Commonwealth cite authority that 
supports its construction. The only authority that the 
Commonwealth offers, Atkins v. Pottstown Memorial Medical 
Center, 634 A.2d 258 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), is inapposite. 
In Atkins, the court merely held that incident reports are 
not shielded by the Pennsylvania statute that protects peer 
review reports from discovery. See id. at 260. Neither Atkins 
nor the statute that the court interpreted in Atkins has 
anything to do with PAMII. 
 
The Commonwealth also asserts that a peer review report 
is not a record "of any individual" because the record 
belongs to the hospital. Appellant Br. at 7. However, the 
preposition "of " may be used to show connection or 
association, as well as ownership, see Random House 
Dictionary of the English Language 999 (1967), and it seems 
clear that the term is used in the former sense here. 
Presumably, many, if not all, of Allentown State Hospital's 
other records concerning Dolores L. are just as much its 
property as the peer review reports, but there is no doubt 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
and injury occurring at such facility that describe[an] incident[ ] of 
abuse, neglect, [or] injury occurring at such facility and the steps taken 
to investigate such incident[ ]." 42 U.S.C. S 10806(b)(3)(A). Dolores L.'s 
peer review reports plainly describe, at a minimum, an "incident[ ] of . . 
. 
injury," namely, a suicide attempt, "and the steps taken to investigate 
such [an] incident[ ]." Id. Moreover, the peer review committees were 
indisputably "charged with investigating [a] report[ ] of [an] incident[ ] 
of 
abuse, neglect, [or] injury occurring at [the] facility." Id. Whether 
these 
committees composed of hospital staff are "agencies" within the meaning 
of the statutory definition is debatable, but we need not decide that 
question here, since it is apparent that the peer review reports fall 
within 
the portion of the statutory definition discussed in text. 
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that PAMII was meant to require the hospital to give PP & 
A access to those records, as the hospital did. Accordingly, 
we hold that a peer review report is a "record[ ] of . . . an[ ] 
individual" under PAMII. 42 U.S.C. S 10805(a)(4). Thus, 
under this provision, PP & A was entitled to have"access" 
to these records. Id. 
 
II. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that, even if the peer review 
reports are "records of . . . [an] individual" under PAMII, 
PAMII does not require that PP & A be given access to those 
records because, according to the Commonwealth, 
Pennsylvania restricts the disclosure of peer review reports. 
There is nothing in the text of PAMII, however, that 
supports the Commonwealth's contention that this federal 
statute does not require disclosure of peer review reports 
that are protected under state law. Indeed, there is not even 
any mention of peer review reports in the legislative history 
that accompanied the initial passage of the Act in 1986. See 
S. Rep. No. 99-109 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1361; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-576, reprinted in  1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1377. 
 
The Commonwealth relies, however, on subsequent 
legislative history and a regulation issued to implement 
PAMII. Appropriations for PAMII expired in 1991 and were 
re-authorized that year. See Protection and Advocacy for 
Mentally Ill Individuals Amendments Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-173, 105 Stat. 1217 (Amending Act). The House 
Report that accompanied the re-authorization stated that 
"[i]t is the Committee's intent that the PAMII Act does not 
preempt State law regarding disclosure of peer 
review/medical review records relating to the proceedings of 
such committees." H.R. Rep. No. 102-319, reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 777, 782. 
 
When Congress re-authorized PAMII, it provided that"the 
Secretary [of Health and Human Services] shall promulgate 
final regulations to carry out this title." Amending Act, S 9. 
Pursuant to this authority, 42 C.F.R. S 51.41(c) (1999) 
provides that "[i]nformation and individual records . . . 
which shall be available to the P&A system under the Act 
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shall include, but not be limited to . . . [r]eports prepared 
. . . by or for the facility itself, that describe .. . injury 
occurring at the facility . . . [and] [r]eports and records, . . . 
prepared or maintained by the facility, in connection with 
such reports of incidents." 42 C.F.R. S 51.41(c)(2). The 
regulation goes on to provide that "nothing in this section 
is intended to preempt State law protecting records 
produced by medical care evaluation or peer review 
committees." Id. S 51.41(c)(4) 
 
The interpretation of PAMII set out in 42 C.F.R. 
S 51.41(c)(4) does not represent a reasonable interpretation 
of the statute, and we must therefore reject it. See Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). As noted, PAMII requires that 
groups such as PP & A be given access to a defined 
category of records. Peer review reports either fall within 
that definition or they do not. The statutory language 
cannot reasonably be construed to encompass identical 
peer review reports in some states but not others. If 
Congress wished to achieve that result, it needed to enact 
different statutory language. It could not achieve that 
result, in the face of the statutory language it enacted, 
simply by inserting a passage in a committee report. Nor 
could that result be achieved by means of a regulation. 
 
We thus hold that PAMII requires that an organization 
such a PP & A be given access to peer review reports such 
as those at issue here irrespective of state law. PAMII 
preempts any state law that gives a healthcare facility the 
right to withhold such records. See, e.g., Pacific Gas and 
Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and 
Development Comm'y, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983); Florida 
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 
(1963). 
 
III. 
 
Although PAMII would preempt a Pennsylvania law that 
prohibited the disclosure of the peer review reports to PP & 
A, we note that there is no conflict between state and 
federal law here because Pennsylvania law does not forbid 
such disclosure. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63S 425.4 (West 
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1996). Section 425.4 merely provides that "[t]he 
proceedings and records of a review committee shall be held 
in confidence and shall not be subject to discovery or 
introduction into evidence in any civil action ." Id. (emphasis 
added) Here, PP & A is seeking the peer review reports in 
order to fulfill the advocacy and investigatory purposes of 
PAMII with regard to Dolores L.'s death. PP & A is not 
seeking to discover the reports or to introduce them into 
evidence in a civil action. 
 
Pennsylvania's requirement that a peer review report"be 
held in confidence" also does not prevent disclosure of the 
reports to PP & A. Id. The statute does not say who is 
required to keep the report in confidence, and the statute 
has not been interpreted to preclude reports from being 
shared with persons outside of a peer review committee. 
See Hayes v. Mercy Health Corp., 739 A.2d 114, 117-19 
(Pa. 1999) (holding that peer review committee materials 
are not privileged from disclosure to a doctor mounting an 
internal challenge to a peer review committee's disciplinary 
recommendation). There is nothing in the Pennsylvania 
statute to support the inference that a peer review report 
must be kept "in confidence" from a state's independent 
advocacy organization. To the contrary, the inference to be 
drawn from the Pennsylvania statute's reference to a"civil 
action" is that the statute requires that peer review reports 
be kept out of the hands of lawyers involved in civil 
litigation. See id. at 118 ("Thus, the intent of the legislature, 
as revealed by the plain language of [the Pennsylvania 
statute] and confirmed by its legislative history, was to 
prevent the disclosure of peer review information to outside 
parties seeking to hold professional health care providers 
liable for negligence . . . ."). 
 
In addition, PAMII imposes a duty of confidentiality on 
the advocacy organizations themselves. See 42 U.S.C. 
S 10806(a) ("An eligible system which, pursuant to [PAMII], 
has access to records which, under . . . State law, are 
required to be maintained in a confidential manner by a 
provider of mental health services, shall, except as provided 
in subsection (b) of this section,3 maintain the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Section 10806(b) provides for disclosure of records to the patient. In 
a civil action, the patient would still be precluded, by the same 
Pennsylvania statute, from discovering the report or from offering it into 
evidence. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63 S 425.4. 
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confidentiality of such records to the same extent as is 
required of the provider of such services." (emphasis 
added)); Robbins v. Budke, 739 F. Supp. 1479, 1488 
(D.N.M. 1990) (noting that PAMII requires that an advocacy 
organization maintain confidentiality of records to the same 
degree as the health care provider). Since PAMII requires 
advocacy organizations themselves to maintain the 
confidentiality of peer review reports, disclosure of peer 
review reports to advocacy organizations is not precluded 
by the Pennsylvania statute. 
 
IV. 
 
For the reasons explained above, the judgment of the 
District Court is affirmed. 
 
A True Copy: 
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